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In search of religious truth, lawyers, judges, and jurors who know almost 
nothing about Islam must wade through multiple layers of translation—
from Arabic to English; from the spiritual to the secular; from the 
metaphorical to the literal. When most Muslims themselves cannot agree 
on what so many aspects of their faith mean, how can American jurors?1
i. intrOdUCtiOn
 The United States is home to an increasingly multicultural legal environment. 
Indeed, our legal system has, to a certain extent, shown itself willing and capable of 
understanding and resolving the world’s dynamic and multifaceted legal issues.2 
Accordingly, Islamic legal disputes have not always been as alien or novel to a U.S. 
court as they may appear to be today.3 Nevertheless, in the wake of the events of 
September 11, 2001, the current relationship between the U.S. legal system and 
Islamic law is oftentimes strained, at a moment when that relationship is more 
important than ever. Among the many issues brought to the fore by the events of 9/11 
is the question of how the increasingly diverse cultural, political, and legal U.S. 
landscapes should interact with the Islamic faith. In the wake of that fateful day, 
tensions have often run high as the United States has attempted to simultaneously 
crack down upon and prevent future acts of terror while also seeking to retain the 
nation’s open, diverse, and tolerant ideals.4 These tensions are increasingly arising in 
U.S. courts, where judges have struggled for more than a decade to adjudicate complex 
issues of Islamic law within the framework of U.S. legal rules and procedures.5 Recent 
controversies have ranged from criminal material support of terrorism cases to civil 
challenges of policies of motor vehicle departments regarding the wearing of a type of 
Muslim veil, the hijab, in state identification photographs.6 Assuredly, blanket 
1. Amy Waldman, Prophetic Justice, Atlantic Monthly, Oct. 2006, at 82, 85. 
2. See, e.g., Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (“The district courts shall have 
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of 
nations or a treaty of the United States.”).
3. See, e.g., Hosain v. Malik, 108 Md. App. 284 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996) (analyzing and granting comity 
to a Pakistani court’s Islamic legal ruling in a child custody dispute); Al-Silham v. Al-Silham, No. 
93-A-1770, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 1316 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 25, 1994) (adjudicating an evidentiary 
dispute relating to materials on Islamic law in a custody matter).
4. See, e.g., ACLU, Reclaiming Patriotism: A Call to Reconsider the Patriot Act (2009) 
(protesting the deprivation of civil rights authorized by the USA Patriot Act, passed in response to the 
events of 9/11).
5. See, e.g., Aliah Abdo, The Legal Status of Hijab in the United States: A Look at the Sociopolitical Influences 
on the Legal Right to Wear the Muslim Headscarf, 5 Hastings Race & Poverty L.J. 441 (2008) (offering 
a detailed survey of U.S. legal controversies and judicial opinions relating to Islamic veiling practices); 
see also Muhammad v. Paruk, 553 F. Supp. 2d 893 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (analyzing a First Amendment 
challenge to judge’s order that plaintiff remove her veil in court); Khatib v. County of Orange, No. 
SACV 07-1012 DOC (MLGx), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24530 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2008) (challenge to 
court officers making plaintiff remove her hijab in court).
6. See, e.g., infra Part III.
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sentiments about the utter incompatibility of Islamic and U.S. law are intellectually 
bereft. They are also counterproductive to efforts focused on making the two systems 
work together, which is important given the irreversibly multicultural world in which 
we live. Still, there are unquestionable differences between the two systems that 
necessitate a nuanced and reasoned approach in order for them to remain concurrently 
legitimate, if not necessarily coexistent, within the U.S. judicial system.7 These 
differences are perhaps never as obvious and problematic as when U.S. courts make 
legal decisions based in large part on the expert opinion of Islamic legal scholars.
 This note argues that the inherently pluralistic nature of Islamic law makes it 
impossible for U.S. courts to legitimately rely upon the expert opinion of Islamic legal 
scholars in the same way that expert legal opinion has traditionally been applied in 
legal proceedings. Generally speaking, the purpose of admitting expert testimony in 
U.S. courts is to explain and to illuminate for the trier of fact certain theoretically 
immutable or “true” facts which the fact finder would otherwise fail to comprehend 
due to a lack of expertise.8 This premise does not fit when weighing issues of Islamic 
law. Islamic law has, since its inception, been a pluralistic field insofar as multiple, 
differing interpretations of a single legal issue can concurrently be “true,” depending 
upon the myriad lenses and approaches available for properly engaging with the subject.9 
However, a U.S. court’s need to concretely establish certain questions of fact and law in 
order to adjudicate a controversy arising under either U.S. or Islamic law will necessarily 
mean that one or another Islamic legal expert’s opinion will carry the day.10 This is 
problematic because the result of the trial can be either a decision lacking the familiarity 
and consistency of a traditional U.S. common law legal proceeding, or one which is not 
a nuanced or legitimate encapsulation of Islamic law (or sometimes both). In either 
circumstance, U.S. judges are making bad jurisprudence on the basis of benign 
ignorance. By analogy, one can imagine how woefully inadequate it would be for a 
foreign court to make a definitive ruling as to what federal law says about an issue on 
the basis of a single decision by a court in one jurisdiction without acknowledging that 
a contrary decision from another jurisdiction can also be authoritative.
 Accordingly, U.S. courts would do better to treat expert Islamic legal opinion as 
a mere supplemental aid to the trier of fact, rather than as a firm basis on which to 
ground legal decisions. U.S. courts should then ultimately decide controversies on 
the basis of what the fact finder deems to be a just outcome, as colored by their 
familiarity with the framework of U.S. policy, precedent, and principles. Striving 
toward a “ just outcome” is, after all, essentially what finders of fact are charged with 
doing in U.S. courtrooms every day.11
7. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 82, Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. v. Mobil Yanbu Petrochemical Co., 546 
U.S. 936 (2005) (No. 05-155).
8. See Jack V. Matson, Suha F. Daou & Jeffrey G. Soper, Effective Expert Witnessing 7–8 (4th 
ed. 2004) [hereinafter Expert Witnessing].
9. See infra Part II.B.
10. See infra Part III.
11. See infra note 152. 
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 Part II of this note will first discuss the use of and rationales for admitting expert 
legal testimony in trials. This Part will then offer a broad illustration of the major 
historical and functional tenets of Islamic law, underscoring some of the intransient 
differences between it and the U.S. common law legal system. Part III of this note 
will then explore in detail why it is problematic for U.S. courts to attempt to utilize 
expert Islamic legal testimony in the same way that other expert testimony is 
traditionally applied in trials. Specifically, this note will analyze three different cases 
from three different fields of law decided by U.S. courts that illustrate this problem: 
United States v. Hayat,12 which deals with criminal prosecutions; Freeman v. 
Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles,13 which deals with the free exercise of 
religion; and Saudi Basic Industries Corp. v. Mobil Yangbu Petrochemical Co.,14 which 
deals with tort law. This note contends that, in each of these cases, decisive expert 
testimony relating to some facet of Islamic law was improperly applied or precluded. 
Finally, Part IV of this note will offer a solution to this issue, suggesting that U.S. 
courts refrain from attempting to make any hard legal or factual determinations of 
Islamic law based on Islamic legal expert testimony, and instead use such Islamic 
testimony as a supplemental aid for coming to just outcomes in controversies on the 
basis of U.S. policies, precedent, and principles.
ii. histOry
 A. The Admission of Expert Testimony in U.S. Trial Practice
 Expert testimony has become a ubiquitous component of U.S. civil and criminal 
trials.15 An expert witness is very basically understood as “a person who, by reasons 
of education or special training, possesses knowledge of a particular subject that may 
be beyond the understanding of the average person.”16 Unlike lay witness testimony 
that must be proffered by someone who actually perceived the evidence spoken of, 
expert witness testimony is premised on reasoned opinion, and the expert need not 
have actually perceived any of the direct evidence at issue at trial.17 Experts are also 
permitted great latitude in what they may testify to, including, in many circumstances, 
opinions as to ultimate issues to be decided by the trier of fact.18
 Trial judges have the discretion to determine whether someone is qualified as an 
expert witness and permitted to offer testimony on a case-by-case basis.19 At the 
12. No. 2:05-cr-240-GEB, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40157 (E.D. Cal. May 17, 2007).
13. 924 So. 2d 48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). 
14. No. 00C-07-161-JRJ, 2003 Del. Super. LEXIS 294 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 26, 2003), aff ’d in part and 
vacated in part on other grounds, 362 F.3d 102 (3d. Cir. 2004), rev’d, 544 U.S. 280 (2005).
15. See Expert Witnessing, supra note 8, at 7.
16. Id. 
17. See Michael H. Graham, Federal Rules of Evidence in a Nutshell 309 (6th ed. 2003).
18. Fed. R. Evid. 704. 
19. See, e.g., Graham, supra note 17, at 319–31 (discussing Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and its 
interpretation by the Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)).
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federal level, the formal rules of evidence are found in the Federal Rules of Evidence 
(FRE), which were adopted by Congress in 1975.20 Expert testimony is dictated by 
FRE 702, which reads, in its entirety, as follows:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, 
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony 
is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of 
reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles 
and methods reliably to the facts of the case.21
Commentators have noted that “[t]he use of expert testimony enables the jury to 
draw the proper inferences from the facts introduced at trial.”22 In other words, only 
“proper” or factually sound evidence should be admitted under the FRE. In practice, 
this becomes a question of “reliability” to be answered by the trial judge.23 In Daubert 
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court articulated what has 
become known as the “gatekeeping” duty of trial judges to prevent the admission of 
unreliable expert testimony.24 The immense discretion of trial judges with regard to 
the admissibility of evidence was reinforced by the Court six years later in Kuhmo 
Tire Co. v. Carmichael, in which it noted that “[t]he trial judge must have considerable 
leeway in deciding in a particular case how to go about determining whether 
particular expert testimony is reliable.”25 Trial judges even have the power to appoint 
their own expert witness.26 Finally, trial judges’ discretion is afforded substantial 
deference by reviewing appellate courts.27
 It is also important to remember that a trial will rarely, if ever, include the 
testimony of only one expert witness; the testimony of one expert witness is logically 
best refuted by an adverse party via countervailing testimony from another expert 
witness.28 This means that, in addition to the reliability requirements of FRE 702 
and its accompanying case law, the veracity of an expert’s testimony will be tested 
20. Expert Witnessing, supra note 8, at 5. Although the FRE are not technically binding on state courts, 
the rules adopted by many states closely mirror the language of the FRE. Cornell University Law 
School, Legal Information Institute, Federal Rules of Evidence, http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/fre/ 
(last visited October 28, 2010). Thus, although two of the cases discussed in this note were heard in 
state courts, for the sake of simplicity and general background, this section only discusses expert 
testimony in the context of the FRE.
21. Fed. R. Evid. 702.
22. Glen Weissenberger & James J. Duane, Weissenberger’s Federal Evidence § 702.3 (6th ed. 
2009) (emphasis added).
23. Graham, supra note 17, at 319, 331–32. 
24. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597. 
25. Kuhmo Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999).
26. Fed. R. Evid. 706.
27. See Kuhmo, 526 U.S. at 152. 
28. See Expert Witnessing, supra note 8, at 7–8; see also the cases discussed infra Part III.
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against that of another expert in their field. Thus, the trier of fact, whether a jury or 
a judge, will ultimately decide that one or another expert opinion is more authoritative, 
or at least more “correct,” than the other. Although expert witnesses should be 
constrained by their oaths to tell the truth and the ethical obligations of their 
respective professions, the U.S. adversarial system necessarily encourages some 
degree of partisanship.29 Consequently, a judge or jury will make determinations of 
fact that decide a case based upon which of the experts’ dueling perspectives most 
compellingly sells an idea of truth.
 B. The Basic Principles of Islamic Law
 Islamic law, no different from the common law, is a complex mechanism, with a 
centuries-long history of evolution and application.30 What follows is a brief summary 
of the field. The bedrock of Islamic law is the Qur’an,31 the primary source of the 
direct teachings of God’s law, or Shari’a.32 The Qur’an, however, is not in itself an 
exhaustive source of legal rules, and so while any explicit command or teaching found 
within it is traditionally considered binding law, it is but the top source in a hierarchy 
of sources in Islamic law.33 Second in the source hierarchy is the Sunna, or the 
teachings and practices of the Prophet Muhammad, which, through the declaration 
in the Qur’an to “obey God and his Prophet,” stands as the most authoritative source 
of interpretation and extrapolation of the Qur’an.34 Together, the Qur’an and the 
Sunna are considered the divine texts of Islamic law.35 The third source is Ijma, or 
consensus, which refers to the shared opinion of Islamic scholars from the Muslim 
community on a given legal issue.36 Finally, the fourth source is Qiyas, or analogy, 
which permits an individual scholar to use analytical reasoning to deduce a legal rule 
from all of the guidance provided by the Qur’an, Sunna, and Ijma.37
 Only a mufti (in the plural mufteen), a very learned scholar-jurist of the above 
sources, is qualified to issue legal opinions about controversies or general questions of 
law.38 The mufteen are not entirely unlike U.S. law professors who write law review 
articles in the hope of influencing the progression of the law, except that the opinions 
29. See Expert Witnessing, supra note 8, at 96–97. 
30. See generally Sadiq Reza, Torture and Islamic Law, 8 Chi. J. Int’l L. 21, 22 (2007) (noting the fourteen-
hundred-year history of Islam).
31. See N.J. Coulson, A History of Islamic Law 55–56 (1964).
32. Reza, supra note 30, at 26. 
33. See Coulson, supra note 31, at 55–60. 
34. Id. at 55–57. 
35. Reza, supra note 30, at 25. 
36. Coulson, supra note 31, at 59. 
37. See id. at 59–60. 
38. See Knut S. Vikør, Between God and the Sultan: A History of Islamic Law 7 (2005).
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of the mufteen are the primary rather than secondary source of Islamic law.39 The 
exacting process by which a mufti ascertains the law on a particular issue is called 
ijtihad, the “derivation of legal rules through study, research and analysis.”40 It is the 
mufti who does the real intellectual heavy lifting in terms of deciding what Islamic 
law says about an issue, although the mufti himself is separate from the court and 
may lack any particular knowledge about the litigants.41 Parties to a dispute appear 
before a qadi (in the plural qada), the judge in courts of Islamic law,42 whose role in 
formulating binding decisions is minimal. While the qada marshal the proceedings 
of the courtroom and ultimately render decisions, they do not necessarily consult the 
four sources of Islamic law in order to issue legal judgments; rather, once again, this 
task is left to the mufti. In fact, mufteen may, from time to time, issue legal opinions 
without having been prompted to do so in response to a specific controversy. Thus, 
the qada direct the finding of facts and issue decisions that are binding on litigants, 
while the mufteen remotely synthesize general fact patterns with their special 
knowledge of the sources to make determinations of law that might or might not be 
applied to a specific controversy.43
 Most importantly, unlike in our own U.S. common law system where judges 
establish binding precedent, the legal decisions made by the qada, pursuant to the 
expert scholarly opinion of a mufti, have no binding precedential value for future 
cases and are no more authoritative than any other decision.44 Thus, as long as the 
ijtihad process is properly derived from the sources of law, any mufti ’s legal opinion 
becomes part of the corpus of Islamic jurisprudence.45 Islamic law presumes that no 
human, save the Prophet Muhammad, can know God’s law with certainty; therefore, 
no single scholarly opinion on a legal issue is more authoritative than another.46 As 
Professor Sadiq Reza explains:
[B]ecause every jurist’s opinion is by definition a product of human agency, 
each opinion is considered both (1) a probable rather than a conclusive 
articulation of the Shari’ah and (2) no more authoritative than the opinions of 
other jurists, no matter how much these views might differ from each other.47
39. See id. 
40. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. v. Mobil Yangbu Petrochemical Co., No. 00c-07-161-JRJ, 2003 Del. Super. 
LEXIS 294, at *12 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 26, 2003) (quoting expert testimony of Herbert S. Wolfson).
41. See Vikør, supra note 38, at 7–8.
42. Reza, supra note 30, at 25. 
43. See generally id. at 25–26 (describing the division of labor between the mufti and qadi).
44. Id. at 26.
45. See Reza, supra note 30, at 26.
46. Id.
47. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Indeed, this pluralistic view of Islamic law is widely acknowledged by contemporary 
scholars,48 and is also reinforced by the existence of seven distinct “schools” of Islamic 
law between Sunni and Shi’i Islam, the two dominant but, again, distinct sects of 
Islam.49 Irrespective of debates between these schools and sects, no one scholar or 
school can claim more authority than any other. As Knut S. Vikør has also explained:
There is no such thing as a, that is one, Islamic law, a text that clearly and 
unequivocally establishes all the rules of a Muslim’s behaviour. There is a 
great divergence of views, not just between opposing currents, but also 
between individual scholars within the legal currents, of exactly what rules 
belong to the Islamic law. The jurists have had to learn to live with this 
disagreement on and variety . . . in the contents of the law.50
This principle is especially important for understanding Islamic law, which is the 
inspiration for the legal systems of many nations,51 including Iran52 and Sudan,53 and 
remains the sole formal source of law in Saudi Arabia.54
 One illustration of the difference between the use of expert testimony in U.S. 
law and the use of a mufti ’s legal opinion in an Islamic legal setting is a murder trial 
in which the defendant proffers the mitigating circumstance of mental disease or 
defect.55 In the U.S. legal system, each side will introduce expert witnesses at trial 
who will compete for credibility as to whether the defendant did or did not have a 
mental disease or defect.56 Although reasonable minds may disagree as to whether or 
not the defendant was or was not sane, in order for the jury to make a decision or the 
court to issue a sentence, one or the other expert’s opinion must be discounted as 
untrue, or at least as less true.57 Furthermore, those experts will be testifying only as 
48. See, e.g., id.; see also Wael B. Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction 
to Sunnī Usūl Al-Fiqh 1 (1997) (“In its developed form, Islamic legal theory came to recognize a 
variety of sources and methods from and through which the law might be derived.” However, “sources” 
in this context should not be understood as something different from the hierarchy spoken of previously, 
but rather as different schools and scholars.); Vikør, supra note 38, at v (“Both a rule and its exact 
opposite can simultaneously be said to be ‘what the Sharīca says’ and what God asks of the believer.”); 
Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. v. Mobil Yangbu Petrochemical Co., 866 A.2d 1, 33 (Del. 2005) (quoting 
testimony of Dr. Frank E. Vogel that there is “no single binding definition of usurpation” in Islamic law 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
49. Reza, supra note 30, at 26. 
50. Vikør, supra note 38, at 1. Indeed, the same principle could be said to be a universal tenet of all human 
spirituality, not just Islam.
51. See id. at 254.
52. See id. at 269.
53. See id. at 273. 
54. Id. at 264. 
55. See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 210.6(4)(g) (1962). 
56. See supra Part II.A. 
57. See generally Weissenberger & Duane, supra note 22 (noting that expert testimony allows juries to 
make “proper” inferences about key issues).
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to issues of fact (e.g., whether or not the defendant is clinically sane), whereas the 
judge is responsible for establishing for the jury issues of law (e.g., the legal definition 
of sanity).58 Unlike expert witnesses in a U.S. legal proceeding, the mufteen provide 
the qada with determinations of what the applicable law is, and may additionally 
apply that law to a factual issue at hand.59 Thus, in Islamic law, a qadi never has to 
choose one mufti ’s opinion over that of another in order to dispose of a case; multiple 
mufteen do not compete in the same case over an Islamic legal principle because, as 
long as the process of ijtihad is properly undertaken, no mufti ’s opinion can be 
considered more or less true than that of another mufti.60
 Finally, despite the differing characteristics of Islamic and U.S. legal systems, 
they are really quite similar in function. For instance, that two mufteen can provide 
two qada with diametrically opposed opinions about the same controversy is no 
different than the fact that two U.S. judges sitting in the same courthouse might 
come to opposite conclusions about a single legal issue. Similarly, a U.S. appellate 
court reviewing a trial court’s decision might have before it a spectrum of legitimate 
precedent from which to choose when crafting a new decision.61 Thus, the U.S. 
adversarial system, in which multiple expert witnesses might vie for perceived 
preeminence within their field, does not lend itself well to the pluralism inherent in 
the structure of Islamic law; perhaps as a result, the U.S. legal system has thus far 
failed to synthesize the two systems effectively.
iii. thE prObLEM iLLUstratEd: a CasE LaW anaLysis
 The inherent pluralism of Islamic law makes it impossible to say that one reasoned 
interpretation of the law is somehow more authoritative or “ just” than another 
interpretation.62 When the fact finder in a U.S. legal proceeding chooses between 
the interpretations of two or more Islamic legal experts, it is, in essence, saying that 
other experts’ interpretations are, at least so far as the facts at issue are concerned, 
not true.63 This is a problematic aspect of incorporating Islamic law into the U.S. 
legal system because, unlike the scientific, forensic, technical, or mechanical fields of 
many other expert witnesses found in U.S. law, Islamic law is not derived from 
58. See, e.g., United States v. Long, 562 F.3d 325, 334 (5th Cir. 2009) (noting that in the context of severe 
mental disease or defect, “courts, not mental health experts, define the meaning of ‘severe,’ and . . . the jury 
(ordinarily) decides whether the evidence adduced to satisfy that legal definition is clear and convincing”).
59. See Reza, supra note 30, at 25–26.
60. See id. at 26. 
61. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 
J.L. & Econ. 249, 250 (1976) (discussing the availability of multiple lower court opinions when an 
appellate court reviews a decision); see also United States v. Larson, 495 F.3d 1094, 1100–02 (9th Cir. 
2007) (demonstrating a circuit court’s reasoning and decision making when resolving intra-circuit 
precedential conflicts).
62. See supra Part II.B.
63. See Weissenberger & Duane, supra note 22; see also Graham, supra note 17 (stating admissibility of 
expert testimony is to be determined based on assistance to trier of fact).
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empirical fact, but rather is a vital component of the legal, governmental, and religious 
aspects of life for more than one billion people.64 The negative ramifications for the 
overall U.S. legal system are twofold: first, decisions are being made by courts that 
have little or no experience with the nuanced workings of Islamic law, rather than on 
the basis of familiar domestic policy, precedent, and procedures; and second, these 
decisions send an erroneous message that there are objectively more and less 
authoritative interpretations of an inherently pluralistic legal system. The end result 
is the same: bad law. The following is an analysis of three cases in which U.S. courts 
have, despite the best intentions and efforts of the judges presiding over them, 
illustrated why Islamic law cannot not be dealt with in the same manner as other 
fields of expertise.
 A. United States v. Hayat
 The Eastern District of California case United States v. Hayat exemplifies how 
misguided reliance by U.S. courts on Islamic legal experts’ divergent cultural 
understandings is creating bad law.65 By excluding the potentially exculpatory 
testimony of one expert and relying entirely on the damning testimony of another 
expert, the Hayat court created a tension with Islamic law where the real issue was 
about regional social practices.
 In the wake of 9/11, the United States has pursued much more aggressive 
prosecutorial policies to prevent future attacks against civilians.66 This approach has 
necessarily entailed prosecuting individuals on the basis of what they or their support 
may someday accomplish, rather than for what has already been done.67 The increasing 
use since 9/11 of laws like the federal statute governing material support for terrorism68 
has come to be known by some as the government’s doctrine of “preemptive 
prosecution.”69 Legal scholars have strongly criticized such laws as a form of strict 
64. Silvia Aloisi, Muslims More Numerous than Catholics: Vatican, Reuters UK, Mar. 30, 2008, available at 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKL3068682420080330 (noting that the Muslim population is 
“generally estimated at around 1.3 billion”).
65. No. 2:05-cr-240-GEB, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40157 (E.D. Cal. May 17, 2007).
66. Waldman, supra note 1, at 83.
67. See id.; see also Hina Shamsi, Let’s Reassess Material Support, Huffington Post, Oct. 23, 2007, http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/hina-shamsi/lets-reassess-material-su_b_69587.html (arguing that material 
support prosecutions seek to punish more than affirmatively illegal conduct and encourage “guilt by 
association”). But see Juan C. Zarate, Supreme Court’s Hard Line on Supporting Terrorists Is the Right Line, 
Christian Sci. Monitor, July 16, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2010/ 
0716/Supreme-Court-s-hard-line-on-supporting-terrorists-is-the-right-line (arguing that “[t]he law 
does not prohibit individuals from independently advocating a terrorist group’s cause nor does it ban 
mere association or membership in [a foreign terrorist organization],” and that the law is necessary for 
preventing actual terrorism). 
68. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2006).
69. Waldman, supra note 1, at 83.
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liability thought crime.70 Oftentimes, expert testimony about a defendant’s specific 
intent is the most important factor in a material support prosecution.71 The power of 
expert witnesses is considerable in this context because, rather than mere civil liability, 
the consequences of a criminal prosecution hang in the balance.
 The stakes are particularly high in a case like Hayat, where an issue as seemingly 
simple as the proper meaning of a message scrawled on a piece of paper can be the 
difference between freedom and a life spent in prison. In 2005, a twenty-two-year-
old man of Pakistani decent from Lodi, California, named Hamid Hayat was charged 
with providing material support to terrorists in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, the 
material support statute.72 During an hours-long interrogation by the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI), Hayat confessed to having attended a terrorist training camp 
in Pakistan during a recent visit, and confessed that he returned to the United States 
to wage jihad.73 However, other than his videotaped confession, the government had 
little in the way of direct evidence linking Hayat to a terrorist organization.74 The 
most important piece of evidence in Hayat’s prosecution was a scrap of paper found 
in his wallet on which a single line of Arabic was written.75 The interpretation of this 
single piece of paper became very important because the material support statute 
requires a showing of intent.76 The prosecution sought to establish Hayat’s intent 
through the use of an expert Islamic scholar who would testify to the meaning of the 
paper’s message.77 According to the prosecution’s theory of the case, what the message 
meant would allow the fact finder to infer Hayat’s personal intent.78 In other words, 
Hayat stood to be convicted on the basis of an expert opinion about his implied 
opinion. Thus, the exact meaning of a single line of Arabic on that piece of paper 
would come to be not only the most important part of the ultimately successful 
70. See, e.g., David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and War, 97 Calif. L. 
Rev. 693, 723–25 (2009); Randolph N. Jonakait, The Mens Rea for the Crime of Providing Material 
Resources to a Foreign Terrorist Organization, 56 Baylor L. Rev. 861, 862 (2004).
71. See, e.g., discussion infra notes 72–87.
72. Waldman, supra note 1, at 82; United States v. Hayat, No. 05-cr-240-GEB, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
40157, at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 17, 2007).
73. Waldman, supra note 1, at 82. Although the word “ jihad ” has no single, universal meaning, in this 
context it is generally understood as “an armed conflict between the Muslim society and a non-Muslim 
enemy.” Vikør, supra note 38, at 36 n.15.
74. See Abigail Cutler, Islam on Trial?: The Author of “Prophetic Justice” Discusses the Murky Business of 
Prosecuting Would-Be Terrorists on the Basis of Their Beliefs, Atlantic Monthly, Sept. 12, 2006, http://
www.theatlantic.com/doc/200609u/waldman-interview. 
75. Id. The other more ancillary evidence used against Hayat consisted “of a taped conversation between 
Hayat and an FBI informant who had posed as an extremist, [some] literature . . . [written] by a powerful 
Pakistani militant, [and] a scrapbook of clippings praising the Taliban and sectarian violence.” Id. 
76. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2006) (stating that the law applies only to one who “knowingly provides material 
support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization” (emphasis added)). 
77. See United States v. Hayat, No. 2:05-cr-240-GEB, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40157, at *51–52 (E.D. Cal. 
May 17, 2007). 
78. See id. at 34–35.
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conviction of Hayat, but also an illustration of how misconceptions about Muslim 
people and culture can lead to courts focusing on the wrong type of expert opinion.
 The prosecution’s witness, Dr. Khaleel Mohammed—a Saudi-trained scholar 
from San Diego State University—first offered to the court a translation of the line 
as, “Lord, let us be at their throats, and we ask you to give us refuge from their evil.”79 
The argument by the prosecution was that this was a “ jihadist note” that constituted 
“probative evidence” of Hayat’s “requisite jihadist intent.”80 After protests from defense 
counsel, the court allowed into evidence the following translation of the text: “Oh 
Allah, we place you at their throats, and we seek refuge in you from their evil.”81 
Following his conviction in 2006 on the material support charge and three counts of 
making false statements to FBI officials, Hayat filed a motion for a new trial under 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33, which allows a criminal judgment to be 
vacated “if the interest of justice so requires.”82 Most important among Hayat’s various 
arguments for a new trial was that the trial court’s preclusion of Professor Anita Weiss 
from testifying for the defense about the paper resulted in the opinion testimony of 
one of the prosecution’s experts being “essentially left unrebutted.”83 Professor Weiss, 
an expert in Pakistani culture and religious practices, would have testified as to her 
belief that Hayat’s piece of paper was a tawiz, a sort of good luck charm commonly 
carried by travelers and other Muslims in Pakistan to ward off evil; instead, she was 
limited to testifying about what a tawiz is in general.84 The district court’s response to 
this argument erroneously focused on only one type of expert testimony. The court 
first reiterated the principle of expert testimony that a trial court “has wide discretion 
in its determination to admit and exclude evidence, and this is particularly true in the 
case of expert testimony.”85 The court then affirmed the previously sustained 
foundation objection that precluded Professor Weiss’s testimony on the ground that, 
because the line on the paper was written in Arabic, which Weiss did not speak, she 
was unqualified to say definitively whether or not the piece of paper was in fact a 
tawiz.86 Ultimately, the court concluded that, because Hayat’s inability to proffer 
79. Waldman, supra note 1, at 83, 89.
80. Id. at 83.
81. Id. 
82. Hayat, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40157, at *2. Under Rule 33, “[u]pon the defendant’s motion, the court 
may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 
33(a). This has been interpreted to mean that a new trial can be granted “[i]f the court concludes that, 
despite the abstract sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict, the evidence preponderated 
sufficiently heavily against the verdict that a serious miscarriage of justice may have occurred.” Hayat, 
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40157, at *2 (quoting United States v. Alston, 974 F.2d 1206, 1211–12 (9th Cir. 
1992)).
83. Hayat, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40157, at *56–57.
84. Id. at *57; Waldman, supra note 1, at 90.
85. Hayat, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40157, at *55 (quoting Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 108 
(1974)).
86. Id. at *57–58.
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Professor Weiss’s testimony that his piece of paper was a tawiz “was not of decisive 
value,” it was not an error to have excluded it from the trial.87
 By excluding Professor Weiss’s more specific expert testimony on the basis of her 
inability to speak Arabic, the Hayat court failed to realize what would have been the 
most pertinent expert testimony in the case. The court’s finding that Professor 
Weiss’s testimony would not have been of decisive value is questionable in light of the 
very different story about the piece of paper that the prosecution was permitted to 
tell. Prosecution witness Dr. Mohammed testified that the paper’s message was 
anything but a peaceful traveler’s charm, but rather was for use “when one is engaged 
in war, a holy war, fighting for God, against an enemy that is perceived to be evil.”88 
Dr. Mohammed’s explanation of the paper’s message may well have been one 
legitimate scholarly opinion about the text’s Arabic translation, but it is noteworthy 
that no fewer than five other experts in Islamic studies and Pakistani culture have 
identified the same line of text as being a well-known supplication of travelers asking 
for protection from God against those who might harm them.89 However, no expert 
testified as to this meaning in Hayat’s trial, something some defense lawyers have 
attributed to a “reluctance on the part of many Muslims to testify for the defense in 
terrorism cases for fear of opposing the government when they already feel 
vulnerable.”90 Thus, the Arabic-to-English translation of the tawiz should only have 
been one part of the analysis; the more important issue was why Hayat carried a 
tawiz at all, and that is the issue Professor Weiss would have testified about. By 
comparison, someone who wanted to understand why U.S. teenagers wear Che 
Guevara t-shirts would not turn to an expert on the history of socialism, but rather 
would seek out an expert on U.S. teenage pop culture or cultural anthropology.91
 The Hayat court’s unfamiliarity with Islam and Muslim culture led it to treat a 
single line of Arabic as objective proof of terrorist intent rather than making a more 
detailed analysis of Hayat’s reasons for carrying the message. Accordingly, the Hayat 
case raises questions as to whether the traditional understanding of expert witness 
testimony in U.S. criminal trials can be routinely applied to interpretive questions of 
Islam while still ensuring a fair criminal trial. It is not unreasonable to expect a 
broader and more comprehensive inquiry into the meaning of an Islamic text when 
that text is a major component of what is essentially a prosecution for having a 
potentially, but not assuredly, dangerous political proclivity.
87. Id. at *56. 
88. See Waldman, supra note 1, at 89.
89. Id. at 89–91.
90. Cutler, supra note 74.
91. In fact, one version of the iconic Che Guevara t-shirt depicting the revolutionary’s image features the 
line “I don’t actually know who this is,” underscoring how there can be a huge difference between an 
object’s objective meaning and the reasons why an individual identifies with that object—the t-shirt 
satirizes the many people who might wear Che Guevara’s face for pop culture’s sake without having any 
real understanding of what he stood for. See Teet Shirts, http://www.teetshirts.com/che-guevara-
parody/prod_284.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2011).
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 B. Freeman v. Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles
 Another example of why the meeting of expert testimony and Islamic law in U.S. 
courts can be problematic is found in the 2006 Florida District Court of Appeal case 
Freeman v. Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles.92 Sultanna Lakiana Myke 
Freeman applied for her driver’s license in Winter Park, Florida in February 2001.93 
In accordance with her interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunna, Freeman regularly 
veiled her face.94 Although Freeman had been permitted to wear her veil for her 
previous Illinois State driver’s license photograph,95 Florida law mandates that the 
Department of Motor Vehicles shall issue driver’s licenses “bearing a fullface 
photograph or digital image of the licensee.”96 By virtue of “mistake,” Freeman was 
permitted to wear her veil in her Florida driver’s license photo; however, following 
the events of 9/11 seven months later, she was sent a letter informing her that she was 
to present herself for a photograph taken without her veil or have her license 
cancelled.97
 Freeman challenged the order to have her photograph retaken in a state court 
bench trial, asserting that the Department’s demand violated Florida’s Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act of 1998 (FRFRA).98 Florida passed the FRFRA in 
response to the U.S. Supreme Court case Employment Division, Department of Human 
Resources of Oregon v. Smith,99 which held that “neutral, generally applicable laws may 
be applied to religious practices even when not supported by a compelling government 
interest.”100 In essence, the FRFRA codified a compelling interest test into state 
law.101 Accordingly, if Freeman could show at trial that the Department’s 
photographing requirement constituted a substantial burden on the free exercise of 
her religion, then the state would have to demonstrate a compelling governmental 
92. 924 So. 2d 48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
93. Id. at 51. It is worth noting that the court made explicit reference to the fact that Freeman was an adult 





97. Id. at 51–52. 
98. Id. at 50. The pertinent language of FRFRA provides that:
The government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion, even if 
the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except that government may 
substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application 
of the burden to the person: (a) Is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; 
and (b) Is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental 
interest.
 Id. at 53 (quoting Fla. Stat. § 761.03 (2003)).
99. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
100. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 514 (1997) (summarizing the holding of Smith, 494 U.S. 872).
101. See Freeman, 924 So. 2d at 53.
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interest in requiring that her photograph show her full face. Once this has been 
established, the state would then need to demonstrate that the law was the least 
restrictive means of furthering that interest.102 FRFRA defines “exercise of religion” 
as “an act or refusal to act that is substantially motivated by a religious belief, whether 
or not the religious exercise is compulsory or central to a larger system of religious 
belief.”103 More importantly, as the appellate court in this case noted, a “substantial 
burden” is defined as “one that either compels the religious adherent to engage in 
conduct that his religion forbids or forbids him to engage in conduct that his religion 
requires.”104
 Both sides presented Islamic legal experts as witnesses.105 Freeman presented, 
and the trial court qualified as an expert witness, Professor Saif Ul-Islam, a professor 
at the University of Central Florida who was also a local Imam.106 He testified that 
“Muslim women must veil themselves and that numerous passages in the Qur’an and 
the Sunnah refer to the veiling of Muslim women and require[] a Muslim woman to 
veil.”107 This was consistent with Freeman’s own contention that Islam forbids 
photographs of the human face and animals.108 The Department presented, and the 
trial court qualified as an expert witness, Dr. Khaled Abou El Fadl, a widely 
published, U.S.-educated law professor who holds a Ph.D. and a Masters degree in 
Islamic law.109 He testified that “in Islamic countries there are exceptions to the 
practice of veiling. Consistent with Islamic law, women are required to unveil for 
medical needs and for certain photo ID cards,”110 and that “the only qualification is 
that the taking of the photograph accommodate Freeman’s beliefs,” which would be 
done by the Department’s existing offer to use a female photographer with no other 
person present.111
 Ultimately, the trial court found in favor of the Department, and on appeal the 
Fifth District Court of Appeal of Florida affirmed that decision.112 Essentially, the 
appellate court adopted, as a matter of fact, the expert opinion of Dr. El Fadl without 
making any further comment on the efficacy of Professor Ul-Islam’s contrary 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 54 (quoting Fla. Stat. § 761.02(3) (2003)). 
104. See id. at 55–56 (quoting Warner v. City of Boca Raton, 887 So. 2d 1023, 1032 (Fla. 2004)). 




109. Id. at 56–57. Dr. El Fadl received his J.D. from the University of Pennsylvania. Faculty Biography of 
Khaled Abou El Fadl, UCLA L. Sch., http://www.law.ucla.edu/home/index.asp?page=386 (last visited 
Jan. 18, 2011).
110. Freeman, 924 So. 2d at 56. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. at 50–51.
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opinion.113 The appellate court noted that Freeman had indeed established that her 
wearing of the veil was “a practice motivated by a sincere religious belief,”114 and that 
the FRFRA “clearly prohibits a reviewing court from conducting a factual inquiry 
which questions the validity or centrality of a plaintiff ’s beliefs.”115 Thus, Freeman 
had effectively established the free exercise of religion element of her claim. However, 
in an extremely brief and one-sided fashion, the appellate court found that Florida’s 
license statute did not constitute a “substantial burden” on Freeman’s right of free 
exercise.116 The appellate court ruled that Freeman’s practice was “merely 
inconvenienced” by the photograph requirement, for which it cited only to Dr. El 
Fadl’s opinion that there are exceptions in Islamic countries to the practice of 
veiling.117 The court offered no explanation as to why Dr. El Fadl’s expert opinion 
was taken to be more reliable than that of Professor Ul-Islam. Professor Ul-Islam’s 
expert opinion was based upon the same two primary sources of Islamic law that Dr. 
El Fadl’s or any other’s opinion would be: the Qur’an and the Sunna.118
 But what is most perplexing and problematic about Freeman is that, under the 
framework delineated by Florida’s FRFRA, the court could have upheld the state’s 
photographing requirement without finding as a matter of fact that Islam “does not 
forbid all photographs.”119 The FRFRA permits the State of Florida to “substantially 
burden” a person’s free exercise of religion if the reason for doing so is a compelling 
governmental interest and the burden is the least restrictive means of advancing that 
interest.120 Thus, the court could instead have found that the photographing 
requirement was indeed a substantial burden on Freeman’s right of free exercise, as 
supported by her assertion and by Professor Ul-Islam’s expert testimony, but that, in 
light of the state’s compelling interest in, for example, being able to identify the 
state’s vast population of drivers, having a single photograph taken by a female 
photographer is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. Despite the 
popular saying that strict scrutiny is “strict in theory, but fatal in fact,” even the 
Supreme Court has noted that that saying is not particularly accurate and that 
compelling government interests can fulfill the least restrictive means criterion.121 
Moving to that prong of FRFRA would also have meant that the case was decided 
113. See id. at 56.
114. Id. (quoting Warner v. City of Boca Raton, 887 So. 2d 1023, 1032 (Fla. 2004)).
115. Id. (quoting Warner, 887 So. 2d at 1032). 
116. Id. at 57.
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 52. Arguably—and this is assuredly debatable—according to the source hierarchy, an expert 
opinion premised on interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunna, like that of Dr. Ul-Islam, should trump an 
expert opinion based solely on the custom and practice of Islamic countries, like that of Dr. El Fadl. See 
supra Part II.B.
119. Freeman, 924 So. 2d at 57.
120. Id. at 53.
121. E.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326–27 (2003).
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on the basis of Florida’s well-established strict scrutiny precedent, and not on the 
legitimate, though necessarily non-authoritative, opinion of a single Islamic legal 
scholar. By doing so, Florida could have retained its photographing requirement 
while avoiding telling Freeman, effectively, that her sincerely held belief that she 
must never be photographed unveiled is, as a matter of fact, erroneous.
 C. Saudi Basic Industry Corp. v. Mobil Yangbu Petrochemical Co.
 The 2003 Delaware Superior Court and 2005 Delaware Supreme Court decisions 
in Saudi Basic Industry Corp. v. Mobil Yangbu Petrochemical Co. are perhaps the clearest 
examples of how U.S. courts’ misguided reliance on Islamic legal experts to adjudicate 
issues involving Islamic law is creating bad law.122 This controversy began when Saudi 
Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC), a Saudi Arabian company, brought an action 
in the Superior Court of Delaware seeking a declaratory judgment that any payments 
made to it by Mobil Yanbu Petroleum Co. (“Mobil”) and Exxon Chemical Arabia, 
Inc. (“Exxon”), joint Saudi defendants in the action, were not overcharges in violation 
of the parties’ contract.123 Mobil and Exxon made a tort and breach of contract 
counterclaim, asserting that SABIC had, for more than twenty years, secretly 
overcharged the defendants for technology SABIC had licensed from a third-party 
corporation.124 The defendants’ tort counterclaim was ghasb, the Saudi Arabian tort of 
usurpation. Because SABIC elected to file its initial claim in a Delaware state court 
rather than in Saudi Arabia, the state court undertook to adjudicate the ghasb claim in 
the manner of a Saudi judge.125 At the conclusion of a two-week jury trial, the jury 
found in favor of the defendants on both counterclaims and ordered SABIC to pay 
them more than $400 million in compensatory damages.126
 SABIC first filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law and, in the alternative, 
for a new trial on the defendants’ ghasb claims.127 SABIC’s argument was that “the 
ghasb verdict in favor of ExxonMobil is deficient as a matter of law because the 
Court did not properly instruct the jury on the elements of ghasb . . . under Saudi 
law.”128 Long before the actual trial, the court undertook to determine the elements 
of a ghasb claim by allowing the expert testimony of both parties.129 SABIC proffered 
122. See Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. v. Mobil Yangbu Petrochemical Co. (SABIC I ), No. 00C-07-161-JRJ, 
2003 Del. Super. LEXIS 294 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 26, 2003) aff ’d in part and vacated in part on other 
grounds, 362 F.3d 102 (3d. Cir. 2004), rev’d, 544 U.S. 280 (2005); Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. v. Mobil 
Yangbu Petrochemical Co. (SABIC II ), 866 A.2d 1 (Del. 2005).
123. SABIC II, 866 A.2d at 6. It is not clear why exactly SABIC elected to bring suit in Delaware rather than 
in Saudi Arabia; however, presumably it made the strategic move thinking it would fare better in a U.S. 
court.
124. Id.
125. SABIC I, 2003 Del. Super. LEXIS 294, at *1–2.
126. SABIC II, 866 A.2d at 6.
127. SABIC I, 2003 Del. Super. LEXIS 294, at *1.
128. Id. at *3. 
129. Id. at *5. 
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the expert opinion of the highly esteemed Islamic legal expert Dr. Frank E. Vogel, 
while Exxon and Mobil proffered the expert opinion of the equally esteemed Dr. 
Wael B. Hallaq.130 Unsurprisingly, however, the court quickly found that it was unable 
to reconcile the differing opinions of the parties’ experts.131 Under the authority of 
Delaware Uniform Rule of Evidence 706, the court appointed its own independent 
expert, Mr. Herbert Wolfson.132 After months of research, the court eventually held a 
hearing at which all three experts testified and were subject to cross examination.133 
The elements of ghasb that were eventually decided upon by the trial court and 
instructed to the jury were: “(a) the exercise of ownership or possessory rights, (b) over 
the property of another, (c) without consent, (d) wrongfully.”134 SABIC, however, 
disagreed with the court’s definition of “without consent” and also argued that a 
necessary element of force was missing from the jury instruction.135 In support of its 
post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law, Dr. Vogel submitted another 
affidavit to the court arguing these two points and asserting that the trial court simply 
got the Saudi law wrong.136 Even more fundamental, however, SABIC also argued, 
with support from the opinion of Dr. Vogel, that it was impossible for a U.S. court 
and U.S. judge to undertake the process of ijtihad, which is explicitly what the trial 
court claimed to have done in deciding upon the elements of ghasb.137 In Dr. Vogel’s 
own words, “ijtihad requires for its credibility qualifications which, on the very face of 
things, neither Prof. Hallaq, myself, or, with respect, any [U.S.] court possesses.”138 
130. Id. at *7, *9. Dr. Vogel is an independent scholar, legal consultant, frequent expert witness, and recently 
retired Harvard Law School professor who is highly esteemed for his expertise in Islamic law and other 
legal systems of the Muslim world, with a particular emphasis on finance and other contemporary 
applications. See Frank E. Vogel—Home, Frank E. Vogel, http://frankevogel.net/home.html (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2010). Dr. Hallaq is a scholar of Islamic law and Islamic intellectual history. See Middle 
Eastern, South Asian, and African Studies, Columbia University, http://www.columbia.edu/cu/mesaas/
faculty/directory/hallaq.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2010). He is currently working as the Avalon 
Foundation Professor in the Humanities at Columbia University, with his expertise largely dealing with 
“the intellectual history of Orientalism and the repercussions of Orientalist paradigms in later 
scholarship and in Islamic legal studies as a whole.” See id.
131. See SABIC I, 2003 Del. Super. LEXIS 294, at *10 (“It was . . . clear before the Saudi law experts took 
the stand that all three differed on the proper elements of a ghasb claim.”).
132. Id. at *5–6. Delaware Uniform Rule of Evidence 706 very closely mirrors that of Federal Rule of 
Evidence 706. Compare Del. Unif. R. Evid. 706, with Fed. R. Evid. 706. Herbert Wolfson is an 
experienced legal practitioner in many Middle Eastern countries, including Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and 
Saudi Arabia. See Professional Listing, Herbert S. Wolfson—Philadelphia, PA, MedLawPlus.com, http://
www.medlawplus.com/professionals/Legal/966439014449788.tpl (last visited Jan. 27, 2011). His work 
is mainly concentrated in commercial law, labor and employment dispute resolutions, shareholder 
agreements, and limited liability companies. Id.
133. SABIC I, 2003 Del. Super. LEXIS 294, at *6.
134. Id. at *4.
135. Id. at *5. 
136. Id. at *7–8. 
137. Id. at *14–15. 
138. Id. at *15. 
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Indeed, the implicit provocative question posed by Dr. Vogel in the SABIC cases is 
whether, irrespective of the number or quality of expert witnesses involved, U.S. 
courts should be in the business of adjudicating Islamic legal claims at all.
 The Delaware Superior Court and, subsequently, the Delaware Supreme Court 
both acknowledged that a U.S. trial judge attempting to undertake ijtihad and adjudicate 
an Islamic legal claim as if a Saudi judge would face substantial challenges; however, 
both courts ultimately found that it was possible and entirely appropriate for a trial 
judge to do so. The superior court began by acknowledging the intellectual challenge 
involved, noting that “ascertaining the proper elements of the tort of ghasb under Saudi 
law was an extremely challenging and drawn out process,”139 especially given the fact 
that “all three [Saudi law experts] differed on the proper elements of a ghasb claim.”140 
The trial court also demonstrated a firm general understanding of Islamic law’s inherent 
pluralism, taking note of Mr. Wolfson’s opinion that ijtihad “may lead to different 
scholars reaching different results at different times, even on similar questions. Such 
different results are viewed as acceptable so long as the proper analytical procedures are 
followed in reaching the results.”141 Accordingly, the trial court rigorously defended its 
handling of the ghasb claim: “The Court employed the ijtihad process as best it could 
under the circumstances and properly ‘navigated within the boundaries of the Hanbali 
school.’”142 Finally, the trial court took Dr. Vogel himself to task, noting that “[e]ach 
time he opined on the subject, [his] definition on ghasb seemed to change.” Further, 
the court stated that it “[was] concerned about Dr. Vogel’s objectivity,”143 and ultimately 
concluded by asking, “[i]f Dr. Vogel is correct in that neither he nor Dr. Hallaq possess 
the qualifications to engage in the ijtihad process, then what Saudi law ‘expert’ would 
be able to assist this United States Court in determining the applicable Saudi law?”144
 On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court likewise demonstrated a fairly nuanced 
understanding of Islamic law’s pluralism, noting that “Saudi judges identify a 
‘spectrum of possibilities on any given question, rather than a single correct answer.’”145 
The supreme court even acknowledged the proverbial elephant in the courtroom:
[T]he division of labor between judges and juries does not readily lend itself to 
the ijtihad methodology that Saudi Arabian jurists are required to employ. . . . 
139. Id. at *11. 
140. Id. at *10. 
141. Id. at *13. 
142. Id. at *14 (quoting Transcript of Saudi Law Hearing Morning Session at 127, SABIC I, No. 00C-07-
161-JRJ, 2003 Del. Super. LEXIS 294 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 26, 2003), aff ’d in part and vacated in part 
on other grounds, 362 F.3d 102 (3d. Cir. 2004), rev’d, 544 U.S. 280 (2005)). 
143. Id. at *14–15. 
144. Id. at *16. 
145. SABIC II, 866 A.2d at 31 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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. . . . Unlike the division of labor inherent in an American jury trial, the Saudi 
jurist’s application of ijtihad, and its resulting remedial decision, would not 
neatly divide between determinations of law and fact.146
However, the adversarial tradition of expert testimony in U.S. courts was again the 
justification for the trial court’s handling of the ghasb elements controversy: “[T]he 
trial judge had no alternative but to decide which expert’s testimony to accept or 
reject. The trial court determined to accept the opinion testimony of Professor Hallaq 
and Mr. Wolfson, and to reject that of Dr. Vogel.”147 Additionally, the court spoke of 
the trial judge’s legal rulings being “correct,” which further emphasized the 
incompatibility of the black and white, adversarial U.S. system of expert witnesses 
with the comparatively harmonious multiplicity of Islamic legal interpretation.148 In 
short, despite its astute recognition of the differences between U.S. and Islamic law, 
the Delaware Supreme Court was destined to fall prey to the same inherent limitations 
of the U.S. system’s ability to accommodate true Islamic law that the trial court did, 
especially in light of the great deference trial courts are afforded in questions of 
expert testimony.149
 Undoubtedly, the entire SABIC saga was wrought with complications, not the 
least of which was SABIC’s own apparent miscalculated venue strategy. As the trial 
court noted:
It is remarkable that SABIC, having purposely selected this forum instead of a 
Saudi Court, knowing the United States legal system is dramatically different 
than the Saudi legal system, comes forward after a verdict against it to claim 
that no American Judge is qualified to interpret and apply Saudi law.150
The Delaware Supreme Court likewise underscored the consequences of SABIC 
electing to adjudicate its claims within the structurally and philosophically different 
U.S. legal system: “Having chosen an American forum whose adjudicatory processes 
SABIC knew were different from those of Saudi Arabia, SABIC cannot fault the 
trial court for having followed those procedures.”151 Furthermore, the unorthodox 
way in which SABIC submitted the new affidavit from Dr. Vogel post-trial, which 
only then asserted that U.S. judges cannot legitimately undertake ijtihad, certainly 
did not clarify for the trial court what had already been a complex and several-
months-long problem. The fundamental issue remained: a U.S. court’s recognition 
that the legitimacy of a qadi ’s decision rests not upon stare decisis, but upon the qadi 
having followed the proper analytical procedures in reaching a result, does not change 
146. Id. at 36. 
147. Id. at 33. 
148. See id. 
149. See supra Part II.A–B. 
150. SABIC I, No. 00C-07-161-JRJ, 2003 Del. Super. LEXIS 294, at *16–17 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 26, 
2003), aff ’d in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 362 F.3d 102 (3d. Cir. 2004), rev’d, 544 U.S. 280 
(2005).
151. SABIC II, 866 A.2d at 37. 
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the fact that U.S. judges are, by simple reality, unqualified to replicate that process.152 
Indeed, this was Dr. Vogel’s ultimate contention.153 The inability of a U.S. court to 
adjudicate a case in the same way that a Saudi Islamic judge would adjudicate it is 
even clearer and more counterproductive to cross-cultural and political relations 
when that court openly admits to having attempted to perform ijtihad. Still, the 
Delaware courts cannot be said to have done anything wrong, per se, as the solution 
to the issues raised in these and the preceding cases may well require direction from 
outside of the courtroom.
iV. a prOpOsEd sOLUtiOn
 Because Islamic law is inherently pluralistic, juries should be instructed, and 
judges sitting as finders of fact should consider, that the expert opinions of Islamic 
legal scholars are equally valid and authoritative and that it is their job as the finder 
of fact to decide what the just outcome of a controversy is, but not to decide an issue 
of Islamic law. Despite the open-endedness of the idea of a “ just outcome,” this idea 
is not altogether foreign to U.S. law and finders of fact. For example, while wrestling 
with the equally ambiguous challenge of ascertaining what constitutes insanity for 
purposes of criminal liability, Judge Bazelon of the District of Columbia Circuit 
Court of Appeals suggested the following jury instruction:
Our instruction to the jury should provide that a defendant is not responsible 
if at the time of his unlawful conduct his mental or emotional processes or 
behavior controls were impaired to such an extent that he cannot justly be 
held responsible for his act. . . .
 The purpose of this proposed instruction is to focus the jury’s attention 
on the legal and moral aspects of criminal responsibility, and to make clear 
why the determination of responsibility is entrusted to the jury and not the 
expert witnesses.154
When deciding a question of fact or law that hinges upon Islamic law, U.S. law 
might similarly instruct juries or direct judges that they are neither capable of nor 
expected to replicate the ijtihad process, but rather that they are permitted by the 
facts of the case before them to rely in part on the testimony of expert A instead of 
expert B in coming to a just or moral resolution of the case. Determining what exactly 
is “ just” or “moral” would call upon judges and juries to draw from their own 
experiences and understanding of U.S. policy, precedent, and principles, precisely as 
they would in any other case involving only domestic law.155 Such an analysis would 
152. Id. at 30–31. 
153. Id. at 32. 
154. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
155. See, e.g., Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 113 (1921) (“If you ask how 
[a judge] is to know when one interest outweighs another, I can only answer that he must get his 
knowledge just as the legislator gets it, from experience and study and ref lection . . . .”).
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be analogous to the broad equitable discretion that many of our nation’s family courts 
already explicitly enjoy; a degree of discretion that should be enjoyed by courts 
hearing all types of controversies implicating Islamic law.156 Thus, judges and juries 
would essentially decide cases in the same way they always have, except they would 
never be expected to ostensibly ground their decision on the basis of Islamic law.
 In practice, this change of approach likely would not have changed the outcome 
of the three cases analyzed herein. The Hayat court could have utilized the existing 
“miscarriage of justice” language from Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(a) to 
grant a new trial in which more testimony about the alternate meanings of the tawiz 
would be allowed, or, even better, in which the tawiz would not be the primary basis 
for convicting Hayat of material support of terrorism.157 Similarly, the Freeman court 
could have elected to uphold the Department’s photographing requirement on the 
basis that it served a compelling state interest and was narrowly tailored to advancing 
that interest, rather than making the sweeping and dubious pronouncement that 
Islam does not require Freeman to wear her veil while being photographed.158 This 
would have been a just resolution of the issue that avoided direct engagement in the 
practice of Islamic law. Finally, the SABIC case poses a more difficult question: 
whether U.S. courts should be trying Islamic legal claims at all. Perhaps the answer 
gleaned from that case is no, and the Delaware trial court instead should have 
entertained only a claim more analogous to fraud under U.S. law rather than the 
Saudi tort of ghasb.159 Or, if the ghasb claim was still litigated, the trial court should 
have abstained from ruling on the elements of the tort as a matter of law, and instead 
should have instructed the jury to weigh the competing expert testimony along with 
the facts and decide who justly should win without explicit reference to Saudi law. 
While the courts in these cases may well have come to a “ just” final outcome, the 
processes by which they did so were not as intellectually sound, nor representative of 
Islamic law, as they could have been. The solution proposed above would have 
avoided the ambiguity and inaccuracy that plagued these trials while preserving the 
courts’ fundamental justice-ensuring function.
156. See, e.g., Rajni K. Sekhri, Note, Aleem v. Aleem: A Divorce From the Proper Comity Standard—Lowering 
the Bar That Courts Must Reach to Deny Recognizing Foreign Judgments, 68 Md. L. Rev. 662, 678 (2009) 
(criticizing a Maryland Court of Appeals decision that refused to grant comity to a Pakistani Muslim 
divorce because “the court could have reached the same result under the State’s jurisdictional authority 
to equitably divide marital property upon divorce”).
157. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a) (“Upon the defendant’s motion, the court may vacate any judgment and grant 
a new trial if the interest of justice so requires.”).
158. See supra note 98.
159. Under Delaware law, the elements of common law fraud consist of:
(1) defendant’s false representation, usually of fact, (2) made either with knowledge or 
belief or with ruthless indifference to its falsity, (3) with an intent to induce the plaintiff 
to act or refrain from acting, (4) the plaintiff ’s action or inaction resulted from a 
reasonable reliance on the representation, and (5) reliance damaged the defendant.
 Browne v. Robb, 583 A.2d 949, 955 (Del. 1990) (citations omitted).
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V. COnCLUsiOn
 The United States stands to grow more multicultural and diverse. This is 
assuredly a good thing, but it also means that our legal system needs to be f lexible 
and culturally sensitive. This is not to suggest, however, that our sense of law, order, 
and justice needs to be abandoned. Rather, our courts need to retain their ultimate 
duty of ensuring justice without mischaracterizing and misrepresenting Islamic law. 
As illustrated previously, the purpose of expert testimony in the U.S. adversarial 
system is to illuminate, for judges and juries, the truth about a complex issue in 
dispute.160 This premise is at odds with the inherent pluralism of Islamic law, in 
which the opinion of one scholar cannot accurately be viewed as any more authoritative 
or potentially just than that of any other scholar.161 The result of this dichotomy, as 
illustrated by the Hayat, Freeman, and SABIC cases, are court decisions that put U.S. 
judges and juries in roles they are ill-equipped to fulfill, and which are inaccurate 
portrayals of how Islamic law functions.162 Thus, U.S. courts would do better to treat 
the testimony of Islamic legal experts as supplemental background information for 
judges and juries to use when attempting to arrive at a just outcome, thereby retaining 
the familiar guiding role of U.S. policies, precedent, and principles, while avoiding 
making erroneous and unqualified determinations of Islamic law. This will protect 
both the justice-ensuring role of our judicial system and signal our nuanced 
understanding of a multicultural and dynamic legal world.
160. See supra Part II.A. 
161. See supra Part II.B. 
162. See supra Part III. 
